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Abstract
This article discusses Rule 56 of the Patent and Trademark Office. Part II discusses changes from the old to the
new Rule 56, and examines the former’s relationship to the law of inequitable conduct. Part III elaborates on
the current status of the PTO’s rulemaking efforts, and Part IV is focused on the new Rule under the APA.
Parts V and VI are about new Rule 56 as a hortatory statement and common-law jurisprudential limitations,
respectively. The author ultimately concludes that the PTO could have chosen to approach the Federal Circuit
as an amicus without a prior rulemaking proceeding. That choice might have allowed the PTO to act more
quickly than the almost three years it has taken to reach this stage in the rulemaking process. If so, the PTO
might have substantially changed the law of inequitable conduct already.
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The Effect of New Rule 56 on the 
Law of Inequitable Conduct 
R. Carl Moy* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Patent owners and members of the patent bar generally agree that allegations of inequitable conduct are appearing too frequently in 
patent litigation. 1 They have laid blame for this situation on the law 
that operates in this area. 2 In their view, the law of inequitable con-
duct is either too vague, or requires too much from the patent appli-
cant during prosecution.3 According to this view, the courts have 
been either unwilling or unable to produce a body of law capable of 
solving the problem. 
*Assistant Professor, William Mitchell College of Law; Of Counsel, Merchant, Gould, Smith, 
Edell, Welter & Schmidt, P.A. 
1 E.g., Lee, Introduction: The Special Ad Hoc AIPLA Committee on Rule 56 and the Evolution 
of Proposed Rule 57, 16 AIPLA 0.1. 1 (1988) ("Fraud and inequitable conduct charges in 
litigation have proliferated in recent years." "[M]any practitioners and patent owners feel that 
indeed 'the sky is falling.' "). Mr Lee's comments appeared in a special, double issue of the 
Ouarterly 10umal of the American Intellectual Property Law Association (AIPLA) devoted to the 
topic of reforming the law of inequitable conduct. 
2 E.g. , Position Paper of Ad Hoc Committee on Rule 56 and Inequitable Conduct of the AIPLA 
(March 11, 1987), reprinted in 16 AIPLA 0.1. 74, 75 (1988) (asserting that legal rules of 
inequitable conduct have "generate[d] uncertainty and confusion as to the enforceability of many 
patents"); Lynch, An argument for Eliminating the Defense of Patent Unenforceability Based on 
Inequitable Conduct, 16 AIPLA 0.1. 7, 8 (1988) (hereinafter "Lynch") (asserting that the cre-
ation of the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit has not been followed by a 
"normalization" of this area of the law); Wegner, Inequitable Conduct and the Proper Roles of 
Patent Attorney and Examiner in an Era of International Patent Hannonization, 16 AIPLA 0.1. 
38,40 (1988) (hereinafter "Wegner") (describing legal standards as "imprecise and difficult-to-
apply.' '); PTO Notice of Proposed Rulemaking-Duty of Disclosure and Practitioner Misconduct, 
54 Fed. Reg. 11334 (Mar. 17, 1989), reprinted at 37 PTe1 533 (Mar. 23, 1989) (hereinafter 
"First PTO Rulemaking Notice"); Remarks of Maurice K1itzman before the Section of Patent, 
Trademark, and Copyright Law at the annual meeting of the ABA, August 5-9, 1989, summarized 
in 38 PTCJ 459, 462 (Aug. 31, 1989) (commenting that the area of inequitable-conduct law is 
in "disarray"). 
3 E.g., PTO Notice of Proposed Rulemaking-Duty of Disclosure, 56 Fed. Reg. 37322 (Aug. 
8, 1991) (hereinafter "Second PTO Rulemaking Notice") ("The current definition [of'infor-
mation material to patentability'] has been criticized as vague and because it does not correlate 
with any concept applied in other areas of the patent law."); Lynch, 16 AIPLA 0.1. at 8 (asserting 
law to be unclear); Wegner, 16 AIPLA 0.1. at 60. 
257 
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In response to this problem, the Patent and Trademark Office 
has promulgated a new Rule 56,4 which defines the duty patent ap-
plicants have to disclose information to the PTO. The new rule at-
4 Section 1.56, Title 37, C.F.R. The text of the new rule reads as follows: 
§ 1.56 Duty to disclose information material to patentability. 
(a) A patent by its very nature is affected with a public interest. The public interest is best served, and the most 
effective patent examination occurs when, at the time an application is being examined, the Office is aware of 
and evaluates the teachings of all information material to patentability. Each individual associated with the filing 
and prosecution of a patent application has a duty of candor and good faith in dealing with the Office, which 
includes a duty to disclose to the Office all information known to that individual to be material to patentability 
as defined in this section. The duty to disclose information exists with respect to each pending claim until the 
claim is cancelled or withdrawn from consideration, or the application becomes abandoned. 
Information material to the patentability of a claim that is cancelled or withdrawn from consideration need not 
be submitted if the information is not material to the patentability if any claim remaining under consideration 
in the application. There is no duty to submit information which is not material to the patentability of any 
existing claim. The duty to disclose all information known to be material to patentability is deemed to be satisfied 
if all information known to be material to patentability of any claim issued in a patent was cited by the Office 
or submitted to the Office in the manner prescribed by @@ 1.97(b)-(d) and 1.98. However, no patent will 
be granted on an application in connection with which fraud on the Office was practiced or attempted or the 
duty of disclosure was violated through bad faith or intentional misconduct. The Office encourages applicants 
to carefully examine: 
(I) prior art cited in search reports of a foreign patent office in a counterpart application, and 
(2) the closest information over which individuals associated with the filing or prosecution of a patent application 
believe any pending claim patentably defines, to make sure that any material information contained therein 
is disclosed to the Office. 
(b) Under this section, information is material to patentability when it is not cumulative to information already 
of record or being made of record in the application, and 
(1) II establishes, by itself or in combination with other information, a prima facie case of unpatentability of a 
claim; or 
(2) II refutes, or is inconsistent with, a position the applicant takes in: 
(i) Opposing an argument of unpatentability relied on by the Office, or 
(ii) Asserting an argument of patentability. 
A prima facie case of unpatentability is established when the information compels a conclusion that a claim is 
unpatentable under the preponderance of evidence, burden·of-proof standard, giving each term in the claim its 
broadest reasonable construction consistent with the specification, and before any consideration is given to 
evidence which may be submitted in an attempt to establish a contrary conclusion of patentability. 
(c) Individuals associated with the filing or prosecution of a patent application within the meaning of this section 
are: 
(1) Each inventor named in the application; 
(2) Each attorney or agent who prepares or prosecutes the application; and 
(3) Every other person who is substantively involved in the preparation or prosecution of the application and 
who is associated with the inventor, with the assignee or with anyone to whom there is an obligation to 
assign the application. 
(d) Individuals other than the attorney, agent or inventor may comply with this section by disclosing information 
to the attorney, agent, or inventor. 
PTO Notice of Final Rulemaking-Duty of Disclosure, 57 Fed. Reg. 2021, 2034 (January 17, 
1992) (hereinafter "PTO Notice of Final Rulemaking). 
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tempts to define a lesser duty. 5 
The substantive language of the new rule has generated signif-
icant comment and debate.6 To date, however, the PTO and others 
have focused little attention on the mechanism by which the new rule 
will affect litigation. Specifically, many participants appear to assume 
that simply changing Rule 56 will work a corresponding change in 
the law of inequitable conduct. 7 
Under the relevant law, the PTO's promulgation of new Rule 
56 will likely not have this effect. Changing the standard in the rule 
will not compel the courts to adopt that standard as the law of in-
equitable conduct. In fact, new Rule 56 is outside both the PTO's 
rulemaking authority and even the Administrative Procedure Act. 8 
As a result, the courts will be free to act on their own perceptions of 
whether the provisions of new Rule 56 are wise. 
II. OLD RULE 56 AND ITS RELATIONSHIP TO THE LAW OF 
INEQUITABLE CONDUcr 
The first paragraph of old Rule 56 set out the patent applicant's 
"duty of candor and good faith toward the Patent and Trademark 
5 Proposed Rule 56, among its new provisions, limits the required information to that "material 
to the patentability of an existing claim," (id.), and specifically defines the persons who have a 
duty to disclose such information. Paragraphs (c), (d). In addition, the proposed rule presents a 
narrower definition of the information that is "material" to patentability than does the current 
rule. See infra pp. 9-11. See generally the remarks of Mr. Lee at the Plenary Session of the 
Annual Meeting of the AIPLA, reprinted in AIPLA Bull. 90-91 (Oct.-Nov. 1991) (hereinafter 
"Lee"). 
6 E.g., 16 AIPLA 0.1. Nos. 1-2 (1988), the comments made at the October 8,1991 hearing 
on proposed Rule 56, summarized at 42 PTCJ 573 (Oct. 17, 1991), and PTO Notice of Final 
Rulemaking, 57 Fed. Reg. 2021 (summarizing public comments and replying thereto). 
7 For example, the representative of the Intellectual Property Owners, Inc. ("IPO"), is reported 
as having observed at a hearing on new Rule 56 that the Federal Circuit "will probably adopt 
any standards recommended by the PTO under the proposed rules." 42 PTCJ 575. Another 
attorney is reported to have asserted that having the rule "on the books" will give notice to the 
courts, who will take care of enforcing it. [d. at 576. The AIPLA has reported that the PTO 
intends to approach the courts as an amicus in one or more cases to urge adoption of the new 
rule. Lee, AIPLA Bull. 92 (Oct.-Nov. 1991). 
8 Ch. 324, 60 Stat. 237 (1946) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 5 U.S.C.). 
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Office."9 The duty included the obligation "to disclose to the office 
information . . . which is material to the examination of the appli-
cation. "10 Information was "material" 
where there is a substantial likelihood that a reasonable examiner would consider 
it important in deciding whether to allow the application to issue a patent.11 
The term "inequitable conduct" refers to a set of legal rules 
that is different from, but related to, that of the duty-to-disclose. 
Inequitable conduct consists of unfair activities on the part of the 
patent owner that will result in a court refusing to enforce the subject 
patent, even though the patent may be valid and infringed. 12 Perhaps 
the most common basis for .inequitable conduct, and the one with 
which this article is concerned, involves allegations that the patent 
owner acted unfairly in the prosecution of the patent. 13 The doctrine 
9 Paragraphs (a) and (b) of old Rule 56 read as follows: 
§ 1.56 Duty of disclosure; fraud, striking or rejection of applications. 
(a) A duty of candor and good faith toward the Patent and Trademark Office rests on the inventor, on each 
allorney or agent who prepares or prosecutes the application and on every other individual who is substantively 
involved in the preparation or prosecution of the application and who is associated with the inventor, with the 
assignee or with anyone to whom there is an obligation to assign the application. All such individuals have a 
duty to disclose to the Office information they are aware of which is material to the examination of the 
application. Such information is material where there is a substantial likelihood that a reasonable examiner would 
consider it important in deciding whether to allow the application to issue as a patent. The duty is commensurate 
with the degree of involvement in the preparation or prosecution of the application. 
(b) Disclosures pursuant to this section must be accompanied by a copy of each foreign patent document, 
non patent publication, or other non·patent item of information in wrillen form which is being disclosed or by a 
statement that the copy is not in the possession of the person making the disclosure and may be made to the 
Office through an allorney or agent having responsibility for the preparation or prosecution of the application 
or through an inventor who is acting in his or her own behalf. Disclosure to such an allorney, agent or inventor 
shall satisfy the duty, with respect to the information disclosed, of any other individual. Such an allorney, agent 
or inventor has no duty to transmit information which is not material to the examination of the application. 
37 C.F.R. § 1.56 (1991). 
The basic form of old Rule 56 was promulgated in 1977. 42 Fed. Reg. 5593 (Jan. 28, 1977). 
This history is discussed at some length in Wamsley, The Rulemaking Power of the Commissioner 
of Patents and Trademarks, Part II, 64 JPOS 539, 549 (1982) (hereinafter "Wamsley, Part II"). 
The rule was amended on several later occasions. 47 Fed. Reg. 21751 (May 19, 1982); 48 Fed. 
Reg. 2710 (Jan. 20, 1983; 49 Fed. Reg. 554 (Jan. 4, 1984); 50 Fed. Reg. 5171 (Feb. 6, 1985); 
53 Fed. Reg. 47808 (Nov. 28, 1988). The only pertinent changes to paragraphs (a) and (b) 
occurred in 1984, when the PTO added the requirement of providing copies of written information. 
49 Fed. Reg. 554. 
1037 C.F.R. § 1.56 (1991). 
11 [d. 
12 See, e.g., J.P. Stevens & Co. v. Lex Tex Ltd., 747 F.2d 1553, 1560-61 (Fed. Cir. 1984). 
13 The AIPLA has estimated that allegations of this type occur in 80% of patent·infringement 
litigations. E.g., Lee, AIPLA Bull. 88 (Oct.-Nov. 1991). 
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has developed entirely by common law;14 Title 35, U.S.C. refers 
nowhere to it. 15 
On its face, old Rule 56 addressed only the internal PTO stan-
dard for determining what information must be submitted to the PTO 
during prosecution. The rule is related to inequitable conduct, how-
ever, because the Federal Circuit has defined part of the legal standard 
in that area with references to Rule 56. Specifically, inequitable con-
duct cannot occur unless the patent applicant's misrepresentations to 
the PTO are material. The Federal Circuit currently defines "mate-
rial" in that sense according to the standard set out in old Rule 56.16 
III. THE PRESENT STATUS OF THE PTO's RULEMAKING EFFORTS 
Because of the relationship between inequitable conduct and an 
applicant's duty to disclose, both the PTO and the concerned interest 
groups hope that changing the rule governing the duty to disclose 
14 E.g., Precision Instrument Manufacturing Co. v. Automotive Maintenance Machinery Co., 
324 U.S. 806 (1945); Norton v. Curtiss, 433 F.2d 799 (CCPA 1970); American Hoist & Derrick 
Co. v. Sowa & Sons, 725 F.2d 1350 (Fed. Cir. 1984); J.P. Stevens, 747 F.2d 1553; Kingsdown 
Medical Consultants, Ltd. v. Hollister Inc., 863 F.2d 867 (Fed. Cir. 1988). 
15 The term "inequitable conduct" appears nowhere in Title 35, U.S.c. See PTO Policy 
Statement on Inequitable Conduct Detenninations (Sept. 8. 1988), reprinted in 36 PTCI 616 
(Oct. 6, 1988). The consequence of a finding of inequitable conduct, unenforceability, appears 
only in Section 282 as one of the defenses that must be affirmatively pled. Section 282 does not 
differentiate between inequitable conduct and other unfair activities, such as misuse and antitrust 
violations, that also give rise to unenforceability. See Digital Equipment Corp. v. Diamond, 653 
F.2d 701, 708 (1st Cir. 1981) (observing, in the context of an examination of the Commissioner's 
authority to promulgate old Rule 56, that the term "fraud" does not appear in Title 35, U.S.C.). 
Congress has recently declined to provide a statutory definition of inequitable conduct. See the 
summary at 36 PTCI 63 (May 19, 1988) and 134 Congo Rec. S14434-03, reprinted at 1988 W.L. 
180647 at 10 (Cong. Rec.). 
16 E.g., Am Hoist V. Sowa, 725 F. 2d at 1363. 
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will change the legal standard for inequitable conductY As an initial 
step in this direction, the PTO on March 17, 1989, proposed dropping 
Rule 56 and redefining the duty to disclose in a new Rule 57. 18 The 
proposed new Rule 57 would have required the applicant to disclose 
only information that the applicant 
knows or should have known would render unpatentable any pending claim. 19 
The purpose of this new Rule was to limit inequitable conduct to 
situations of "but for" materiality; inequitable conduct would occur 
only when the PTO would not have allowed the particular patent to 
issue, but for the applicant's failure to disclose the subject informa-
tion.20 After substantial proceedings, the PTO withdrew the proposed 
rule in August 1991.21 
17 E.g., PTO Notice of Final Rulemaking, 57 Fed. Reg. 2023 ("The rule as promulgated will 
provide greater clarity and hopefully minimize the burden of litigation on the question of ineq· 
uitable conduct .... "); Lee, AIPLA Bull. 90 (Oct.-Nov. 1991) (reporting position of PTO); 
Statement of Wamsley on behalf of the IPO, 42 PTc] 575 (inequitable conduct implicit in PTO's 
rulemaking); accord, Statement of Jan Jancin on behalf of the ABA, id. See generally the papers 
collected as 16 AIPLA Nos. 1, 2 (1988). 
This hope may rest on an unduly optimistic view of the relevant Federal Circuit decisions. The 
Federal Circuit has carefully avoided relying on the authority of Rule 56 when discussing ineq-
uitable conduct. Rather, the court has found the standard set out in Rule 56 persuasive on its 
merits. E.g., AmHoist v. Sowa, 725 F.2d at 1363. The standard for inequitable conduct need not 
be as lenient as the PTO's imposition of a duty to disclose information. Cf. Digital Equipment 
Corp. v. Diamond, 653 F.2d 701, 708 (1st Cir. 1981) (upholding the 1977 version of Rule 56; 
duty imposed by PTO no more stringent than the standard for inequitable conduct); Norton v. 
Curtiss, 433 F.2d 779 (CCPA 1970) (same). Simply changing the standard in Rule 56 therefore 
may not change the standard for inequitable conduct, even if the Federal Circuit holds new Rule 
56 to control the PTO's handling of its own internal affairs. 
This is significantly different from the mechanism Wamsley envisioned for Rule 56 in 1983. 
He asserted that a patentee's failure to comply with the PTO's duty to disclose regulations should 
affect infringement and validity determinations directly. Wamsley, Part II, 64 JPOS at 562. 
It appears likely that the PTO will ask the Federal Circuit to equate the standard of inequitable 
conduct with the duty to disclose in new Rule 56. See supra note 7. In that event the court is 
likely to address the degree to which new Rule 56 is controlling, despite the prior decisions. 
18 First PTO Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 54 Fed. Reg. 11334. 
19 Fed. Reg. 11341. 
20 E.g., 54 Fed. Reg. at 11336 (" Section 1.57(b), as proposed, represents a significant de-
parture from the standard defined under § 1.56. It adopts a "but for" standard of materiality .. 
. . "). 
21 The PTO formally withdrew its First Notice of Proposed Rulemaking at 56 Fed. Reg. 37322 
(Aug. 6, 1991). It had indicated earlier, however, that it was abandoning the rulemaking effort. 
See the remarks of Commissioner Manbeck at the 1990 Chicago meeting of the ABA Section of 
Patent, Trademark, and Copyright Law, reprinted in 40 PTCJ 323 (Aug. 16, 1990). This change 
in the PTO's position roughly coincided with the Hon. Harry Manbeck replacing Donald Quigg 
as Commissioner of Patents and Trademarks. Lee, AIPLA Bull. 90 (Oct.-Nov. 1991). 
HeinOnline -- 74 J. Pat. & Trademark Off. Soc’y 263 1992
April 1992 The Effect of New Rule 56 263 
Simultaneously, the PTO brought forward a proposal for a new 
and different Rule 56.22 Under this proposed new rule, information 
would be material if . 
(1) It creates, by itself or in combination with other information, a prima facie 
case of unpatentability of a claim; or 
(2) It supports a position of unpatentability taken by the office which the appli-
cant disputes, or it is inconsistent with a position in support of patentability on 
which the applicant relies.23 
Thus, the proposed new rule sought to impose an intermediate stan-
dard of disclosure, more lenient than the standard of present Rule 
56, but more stringent than the "but for" standard of earlier-proposed 
Rule 57.24 The period for the public to submit comments on the new 
Rule 56 closed on October 8, 1991.25 The PTO held a public hearing 
on the matter that same day. 26 
The PTO promulgated its new Rule 56 on January 17, 1992.27 
In response to the public comments is received, it made a number of 
changes from the proposed text. 28 Among them, the rule now defines 
the term "material" somewhat differently. The new rule repeats the 
criterion set out in originally proposed subparagraph (1). The alternate 
criteria in subparagraph (2) of the new rule, however, are narrower 
than the originally proposed provision. That subparagraph now states 
that information is material if 
(2) It refutes, or is inconsistent with, a position the applicant takes in: 
(i) Opposing an argument of unpatentability relied on by the Office, or 
(ii) Asserting an argument of patentability. 29 
IV. NEW RULE UNDER THE APA 
Generally speaking, the AP A classifies agency rulemaking ac-
tions as either interpretive rules, or procedural and internal rules, 
22 Second PTO Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 56 Fed. Reg. 37321 (Aug. 6, 1991). 
23 [d. at 37329. See the explanation of these provisions, i.d. at 37324. 
24 See e.g., the comments presented to the PTO at its October 8, 1991 hearing, 42 PTCJ 573. 
Compare the comments of Peter Saxon on behalf of the New York Patent, Trademark and 
Copyright Association ("NYPTCLA") at that hearing (hereinafter "Saxon") (asserting that the 
standard of materiality in proposed Rule 56 is consistent with court decisions). 
25 56 Fed. Reg. 37322. 
26 [d. See 42 PTCJ 573. 
27 See supra note 4. 
28 PTO Notice of Final Rulemaking, 57 Fed. Reg. 2021-22. 
29 [d. at 2034. See the PTO's discussion of its rationale, id. at 2022, 2026. The change is 
discussed in greater detail in Lee, AIPLA Bull. 91 (Oct.-Nov. 1991). 
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statements of policy, or substantive rules.30 Unfortunately, it does 
not define any of these terms.31 Instead, the courts have to do so. 
Interpretive rules, as the name suggests, "are statements as to what 
the administrative officer thinks the statute or regulation means. "32 
In general, the courts have defined rules of practice and procedure 
"as including agency rules that detail the procedures and methods to 
be used in executing any inquiry. "33 A statement of policy 
is merely an announcement to the public of the policy which the agency hopes to 
implement in future rulemakings or adjudications. A general statement of policy, 
like a press release, presages an upcoming rulemaking or announces the course of 
action which the agency intends to follow in future adjudications.34 
Substantive rules are generally considered to be "any rule issued in 
accordance with law that is not an organizational, procedural, in-
terpretive, or statement of policy announcement. "35 
While an agency must provide notice and comment before is-
suing a substantive rule,36 it need not undertake such procedures 
305 U.S.C. § 553. See generally 3 Stein, Mitchell and Mezines, Administrative Law § 15.07[1] 
(1990) (hereinafter "Stein"). 
31 See 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(A). E.g., Brown Express, Inc. v. United States, 607 F.2d 695 (5th 
Cir. 1979) (noting failure to provide definition of interpretive rules); 3 Stein § 15.07[5] (discussing 
failure to define rules of procedure and practice); 3 Stein § 15.07[4] (discussing failure to define 
statements of policy). 
32 Brown Express, 607 F.2d at 700 (quoting the cited passage from Gibson Wine Co. v. 
Snyder, 194 F.2d 329, 331 (D.C. Cir. 1952) as "[p]erhaps the most often cited definition of 
interpretive rules"). Interpretative rules are "rules or statements issued by an agency to advise 
the public of the agency's construction of the statutes and rules which it administers." Attorney 
General's Manual on the APA, at 30 n.3 (1947) (citing authorities). 
33 3 Stein § 15.07[5] (citing authorities). 
34 Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. FPC, 506 F.2d 33, 39 (D.C. Cir. 1974). Stein has described 
statements of policy as 
announc[ing) an agency's policy plan for enforcement of a particular statute. They impose no rights or obligations 
and have no substantial impact on affected members of the pUblic. 
3 Stein § 15.07[4] (citing authorities). 
35 3 Stein § 15.07[2]. Accord Attorney General's Manual on the APA, at 27 (1947). 
Substantive regulations- Many statutes contain provisions which become fully operative only after exercise 
of an agency's rule-making function. Sometimes the enjoyment of a privilege is made conditional upon regu-
lations .... Sometimes the extent of an affirmative duty is to be fixed by regulations .•.. Sometimes a 
prohibition is made precise by regulations •... In such instances the striking characteristic of the legislation 
is that it attaches sanctions to compel observance of the regulations by imposing penalties upon or withholding 
benefits from those who disregard their terms. 
Report of the Attorney General's Committee on Administrative Procedure in Government Agen-
cies, at 27 (1941). 
Professor Davis refers to substantive rules as "legislative," due to their relation to Congress' 
delegation of its legislative authority to the agency. See 2 Davis, Administrative Law §§ 7.8, 7.9 
at 47 (2d ed. 1978) (hereinafter "Davis"), and the discussion infra at pp. 16-20. 
365 U.S.C. § 553. 
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before taking other forms of action.37 The procedures followed by 
the PTO with regard to new Rule 56 are consistent with the notice 
and comment required before issuing a substantive rule.38 The PTO, 
however, has not stated which type of action it considers new Rule 
56 to be.39 
The assignment of new Rule 56 into these categories is a matter 
of some importance. Once promulgated, substantive rules are said to 
have the "force and effect of law," and bind the courts.4O Thus, if 
the PTO's new Rule 56 were considered a substantive rule, it would 
arguably bind the Federal Circuit to the PTO's viewpoint. Agency 
actions that fall into the other categories, in contrast, do not bind the 
courtS.41 Still further, some decisions assert that the amount of de-
ference that a non-substantive agency action will be given will vary 
depending on the category into which the action falls. 42 
The relationship between new Rule 56 and the AP A may be 
important for another reason. In a 1991 decision, Animal Legal De-
fense Fund v. Quigg,43 the Federal Circuit for the first time expressly 
referred to the AP A at length in determining whether a PTa action 
375 U.S.C. § 553 (b)(A). See Stein § 15.07[1]. 
38 See the Second PTO Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 56 Fed. Reg. 37321, 42 PTCJ 349. 
Wamsley asserted in 1983 that the PTO used noticed-and-comment procedures for all its rules. 
Wamsley, Part II, 64 JPOS at 543. That statement does not appear to describe the current PTO 
practice. See the procedures used in connection with the action at issue in Animal Rights Legal 
Defense Fund v. Quigg, 932 F.2d 920, discussed infra at pp. 15-16. The PTO now appears to 
engage in this type of summary action commonly. See, e.g., the Commissioner's recent notices 
regarding fraud and inequitable conduct in interference proceedings, infra pp. 32-33. 
39 It is interesting to note that Wamsley asserts the PTO was unsure in 1977 whether old Rule 
56 would have the "force and effect of law," by which he probably means to refer to whether 
the rule was substantive. Wamsley, Part I, 64 JPOS 519. Wamsley was Director of the PTO's 
Trademark Examining Operation at the time he made the statement. 
40 Stein § 13.03[1]; 2 Davis § 7:13. 
41 As to interpretive rules, see generally 3 Stein 15.07[3]. 
Interpretations . .• are not binding upon those affected for, if there is disagreement with the agency's view, 
the question may be presented for determination by a court. 
Report of the Attorney General's Committee on Administrative Procedure in Government Agen-
cies, at 27 (1941). E.g., General Electric v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125 (1976). 
See however, the discussion of Chevron, U.S.A. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 
U.S. 837 (1984), infra note 73. The uncertainty concerning deference to interpretive rulings is 
of little moment in any event, since it appears clear that new Rule 56 is not an interpretive rule. 
See the discussion infra pp. 27-30. 
As to statements of policy, see generally 2 Davis § 7:5. 
42 See 2 Davis § 7:5 at 24-25 and the discussion of Chevron, 467 U.S. 837, infra note 73. 
43932 F.2d 920. 
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was valid.44 The sophistication and rigorousness of the analysis in 
Animal Legal Defense Fund, penned by Chief Judge Nies for a five-
judge panel, stands in sharp contrast to earlier treatments of similar 
administrative-law issues by the Court of Customs and Patent Ap-
peals.45 It suggests that the Federal Circuit will scrutinize new Rule 
56 carefully in light of accepted principles of administrative law. 
A. Rule 56 as a Substantive Rule 
Careful scrutiny is unlikely to result in new Rule 56 being char-
acterized as a substantive rule. An agency's power to promulgate 
substantive rules derives from the Congress' delegation of its legis-
lative authority. 46 In other words, Congress must have delegated au-
thority to an agency for the agency to adopt substantive rules. 47 
Substantive rules that extend beyond that authority are invalid.48 
Section 6 of Title 35, U.S.C., sets forth Congress' delegation 
of its legislative authority to the PTO.49 The language of that section 
appears to be too narrow to support new Rule 56 for several reasons. 
Section 6 limits the PTO's authority to rules that are "not inconsistent 
with law. "50 The term "law" in Congress' delegation is broad enough 
to encompass the common law developed in the courts. 51 It is abun-
44 Animal Legal Defense Fund dealt with an interest group's challenge to the PTO's decision 
to interpret 35 U.S.C. § 101 to include multi·celled organisms as patentable subject matter. The 
PTa had issued its decision in a notice without first providing interested persons with notice-and-
comment. The interest group was therefore attempting to characterize the PTa action as a sub-
stantive rule, issued without proper procedure. The Federal Circuit held the action to be interpre-
tive, and therefore exempt from the notice-and-comment provisions of the APA. Id. at 927-31. 
45 See the discussion of In re Van Omum, 686 F.2d 937 (CCPA 1982), infra pp. 25-27. 
Compare also Norton v. Curtiss, 433 F.2d 799, 791-92 (CCPA 1970), infra pp. 27-30. 
46 See generally 1 Stein § 3.03. 
47 Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281 (1979). Strauss, An Introduction to Administrative 
Justice in the United States, at 156 (1989). 
485 U.S.C. § 706(2) (C). Ethicon v. Quigg, 849 F.2d 1422, 1425 (Fed. Cir. 1988); Patlex 
Corp. v. Mossinghoff, 758 F.2d 594, 606 (Fed. Cir. 1985); American Standard, Inc, v. U.S., 
602 F.2d 256, 261 (Ct. Cl. 1979); 1 Stein § 3.03[5]; 2 Davis § 7.8. See, e.g., Civil Aeronautics 
Board v. Delta Airlines, Inc, 367 U.S. 316 (1961). 
49 He [the Commissioner) may, subject to the approval of the Secretary of Commerce, establish regulations, not 
inconsistent with law, for the conduct of proceedings in the Patent and Trademark Office. 
The PTO has also invoked Pub. L. No. 97-247 (Aug. 27, 1982) as authority for Rule 56. Note 
to Rule 56, Title 37, C.F.R. (1990). The provisions of that law, which deal with funding of the 
PTO and miscellaneous other issues, are not relevant to the present topic. See generally H.R. 
Rep. No. 548, 97th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1982 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 765. 
50 See note 49. Ethicon v. Quigg, 849 F.2d at 1425 ("The ultimate question here is whether 
the Commissioner's exercise of authority to stay a reexamination purportedly pursuant to section 
6(a) conflicts with laws governing reexaminations specifically. If it does, it cannot stand."). 
51 Wamsley, Part II, 64 JPOS at 556 ("PTO rules must be consistent both with statutory law 
and with the established case law of the courts. "). 
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dantly clear, however, that the primary purpose of new Rule 56 is 
not to describe the law of inequitable conduct as defined in the cases. 
Rather, the rule is plainly intended to set forth a standard that is 
significantly different from the current law. 52 Thus, new Rule 56 is 
expressly outside the Commissioner's legislative authority.53 
In addition, the Commissioner of Patents and Trademarks has 
been authorized only to "establish regulations ... for the conduct 
of proceedings in the Patent and Trademark Office. "54 This is much 
narrower than the delegations that other agencies have received. 55 For 
example, Congress has phrased its delegation to the Food and Drug 
Administration in the following terms: 
The authority to promulgate regulations for the efficient enforcement of this chap-
ter, except as otherwise provided in this section, is vested in the Secretary. 56 
Congress' delegation appears to limit the Commissioner's au-
thority to matters occurring within the PTO. In fact, however, it is 
entirely possibly that Congress has delegated to the Commissioner 
only the authority to promulgate the types of rules concerning pro-
cedure and internal management that are referred to in 5 U.S.C. § 
52 See the discussion supra pp. 8-11. Other aspects of proposed Rule 56 in addition to the 
new standard of materiality are also different from the current law. For example, "[p]urging 
misconduct would be much liberalized." Lee, AIPLA Bull. 90 (Oct.-Nov. 1991). In addition, 
the new rule would eliminate the adverse consequences of A.B. Dick Co. v. Burroughs Corp., 
798 F.2d 1392 (Fed. Cir. 1986). Remarks of Lee on behalf of the AIPLA at the October 8, 1991 
hearing, 42 PTCJ 574. 
The now-abandoned Rule 57, of course, was also designed to present a standard different from 
the current law. See, e.g., supra pp. 8-10. 
In contrast to the present rulemaking efforts, the 1977 version of Rule 56 was promulgated to 
codify the case law as it existed at the time. 
The section codifies the existing Office policy on fraud and inequitable conduct, which is believed consistent 
with the prevailing case law in the Federal Courts. 
42 Fed. Reg. 5589. See Wamsley, Part I, 64 JPOS at 518. This same relationship was apparently 
critical to the decision of the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals to uphold an earlier version 
of Rule 56 in Norton v. Curtiss, 433 F.2d at 792. See infra pp. 27-30. 
53 According to the AIPLA, the PTO will argue to the courts that the standard of materiality 
in proposed Rule 56 is not inconsistent with the language of present Rule 56. Lee, AIPLA Bull. 
92 (Oct.-Nov. 1991). Based on the foregoing discussion, however, this argument is likely to be 
held insufficient. The appropriate question is whether the standards of proposed Rule 56 are 
consistent with the existing caselaw, not with the PTO's prior rulemaking efforts. 
54 See supra note 49. 
55 A common formulation of delegation is to empower the agency to "make ... such rules 
and regulations as may be necessary to carry out the provisions of this Act." See Mourning v. 
Family Publications Service, Inc., 411 U.S. 356, 369 (1973). 
56 21 U.S.C. § 371(a). Even the broad language of this delegation did not forestall serious 
debate over the Secretary's ability to promulgate substantive, as opposed to merely interpretive, 
rules. See National Nutritional Foods Association v. Weinberger, 512 F.2d 688 (2d Cir. 1975). 
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553(b)(A).57 If this view of Congress' delegation is correct, the PTO 
may have no power to promulgate substantive rules.58 
There appears to be a significant possibility that such an inter-
pretation is the correct one.59 The legislative history of Section 6, 
57 See generally Stein § 15.07[5]. 
58 The PTO has taken a curious series of positions regarding its power to revise Rule 56. 
Initially, in response to the AIPLA's resolution calling for the definition of "materiality" to be 
changed to a but-for standard, the PTO asserted that such a change "would require legislation." 
Tegtmeyer, The Patent and Trademark Office View of Inequitable Conduct or Attempted Fraud 
in the Patent and Trademark Office, 16 AIPLA 0.1. 88,95 (1988). See also the PTO's view of 
the AIPLA's call to liberalize the standard for purging misconduct, id. at 94. Within a year, 
however, the PTO was proposing a but-for standard of materiality in now-abandoned Rule 57. 
See supra pp. 8-10. No intervening legislation had passed. See supra note 15. 
Thereafter, when Mr. Manbeck became Commissioner, the PTO dropped the effort to pro-
mulgate Rule 57 in favor of retaining the materiality standard "in present Rule 56." One reason 
given was that present Rule 56 "is the standard followed by the Federal Circuit." "[T]he PTO 
must act in accordance with the Court decisions on inequitable conduct .... " 40 PTCJ 323 
(Aug. 18, 1990) (reprinting text of Commissioner's statement to the ABA's Section of Patent, 
Trademark, and Copyright Law at its Chicago, 1990 meeting). 
The standard in new Rule 56 is contrary to the standard followed by the Federal Circuit, see 
supra note 52, apparently reflecting yet another change in position. The PTO now asserts that 
"[t]he amendment to § 1.56 comes with the authority of the Commissioner for establishing 
regulations." PTO Notice of Final Rulemaking, 57 Fed. Reg. 2024. See infra p. 27. 
59 See e.g., the following language in Animal Legal Defense Fund, 932 F.2d at 930: 
[T]he authority granted in section 6 is directed to the "conduct of proceedings" before the Office. A substantive 
declaration with regard to the Commissioner's interpretation of the patent statutes ... does not fall within the 
usual interpretation of such statutory language. 
Accord, McCrady, Patent Office Practice at 18 (2d ed. 1946). This same observation should apply 
to PTO actions interpreting common law. See Animal Legal Defense Fund, 932 F.2d at 928. 
In connection with whether the PTO's delegation excludes substantive rulemaking power, it 
may be useful to compare that delegation to the Privacy Protection Study Commission's delegation 
in the Privacy Act, Pub. L. No. 93-579, 88 Stat. 1896 (1974). The Commission is authorized 
to adopt, amend, and repeal regulations governing the manner of its operations, organization, and personnel. 
Id. at § 5(e)(4). 
This appears to be an example of Congress expressly excluding substantive rulemaking authority 
from its delegation to an agency. The legislative history of the Privacy Act reveals that the 
provision was specifically intended to "insure that the courts would not interpret these ..• rules 
which the Commission is authorized to issue as having the force of law with respect to any other 
Federal agency." S. Rep. No. 1183, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1982 U.S. Code Congo 
& Admin. News 6916, 6954. See also id. at 6950. 
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although somewhat antiquated, also seems to support this view. 60 
B. Rule 56 as a Procedural Rule 
New Rule 56 is also unlikely to be characterized as a rule of 
procedure. In the past, courts refused to place agency rules in this 
category if they had a substantial impact on interested persons.61 More 
recently, the courts have tended to apply a functional analysis to the 
question.62 The law is not settled as to which test is correct. 63 
New Rule 56 appears not to be a matter of procedure no matter 
which test is used. The new rule is intended to significantly curtail 
the obligations that patent applicants have to the PTO and, by exten-
sion, to the public with regard to the disclosure of information.64 In 
addition, the 'new rule is intended to create substantial new rights in 
the patent applicant. 65 
These characteristics should cause new Rule 56 to fail the sub-
stantial-impact test. In this regard, Pharmaceutical Manufacturers 
Association v. Finch66 is instructive. PMA dealt with regulations pro-
mulgated by the Commissioner of Food and Drugs. The regulations 
set new standards of evidence necessary to demonstrate the effec-
tiveness of drug products and applied those standards retroactively to 
drugs that had already been approved. Failure to establish that a drug 
was effective would have resulted in the marketing approval of the 
drug being either suspended or removed. Thus, the regulation called 
60 Wamsley, Part II, 64 JPOS at 554. See the comments of Congressman Jenckes, reprinted 
in Congressional Globe, 41st Cong., 2d Sess., 2855-56 (April 20, 1870) ("It is part of the 
recommendation of the committee ... that the power which the Commission shall have and 
ought to have shall be that of regulating the manner in which the proceedings shall be conducted 
in his Office; the rules of court, so to speak, not the rules of decision but of government." 
(emphasis added». The legislative history of the language in section 6 is discussed in some detail 
in Wamsley, Part I, 64 JPOS at 493-97. 
Wamsley argues that, despite the legislative history, the Commissioner's delegation extends to 
substantive rules. [d. at 554-56. He argues the CCPA held in Van Ornum, 686 F.2d 937, that 
Congress' delegation to the PTO includes the power to promulgate substantive rules. Van Ornum, 
however, can be best read as holding the particular rule tobe interpretive, not substantive. See 
infra pp. 25-27. Wamsley's expressed rationale for considering Van Ornum to be otherwise is 
not compelling. Compare Wamsley's statements at 64 JPOS at 542 with those at 554. 
61 See e.g., First National Bank of Lexington, Tenn. v. Sanders, 946 F.2d 1185 (6th Cir. 
1991). For a discussion of the substantial impact test, see 3 Stein §§ 15.06, 15.07[5]; 1 Davis § 
6:29. 
62 E.g., First National Bank v. Sanders, 946 F.2d 1185; Air Transport Association of America 
v. Department of Transportation, 900 F.2d 369 (D.C. Cir. 1990). 
63 E.g., First National Bank v. Sanders, 946 F.2d 1188-89. 
64 See supra pp. 17-18. 
65 See supra, note 52. 
66 307 F. Supp. 858 (D. Del. 1970). 
HeinOnline -- 74 J. Pat. & Trademark Off. Soc’y 270 1992
270 R. Carl Moy JPTOS 
into question the ability of drug manufacturers to continue marketing 
various products. 
In an effort to persuade the court that the regulation was valid, 
the agency argued that it was procedural. The court, however, had 
little difficulty determining the impact of the regulation to be sub-
stantial. It therefore found the regulation to be substantive and not 
procedural. 67 . 
The ... regulations, which prescribe in specific detail, for the first time, the kinds 
of clinical investigations that will be deemed necessary to establish the effectiveness 
of existing and future drug products and which require that such evidence be 
submitted as a condition to avoiding summary removal from the market, are per-
vasive in their scope and have an immediate and substantial impact on the way 
PMA's members subject to FDA's regulation, conduct their everyday business. 
The regulations apply to more than 2000 drug products first marketed between 
1938 and 1962 with FDA approval and place them all in jeopardy .... 68 
There are interesting parallels between the regulation at issue in 
PMA and the intended reach of the PTO's new Rule 56. Both rules 
govern the information that an applicant must submit to an agency. 
Under both rules, the penalty for failing to provide the required in-
formation is the failure to obtain the applied-for right: in PMA, the 
FDA would not authorize marketing of the drug, while in the case 
of Rule 56, the district courts will refuse to provide a remedy for 
patent infringement. Both rules, moreover, are concerned with bal-
ancing the private interests of the specific applicants with the interests 
of the public at large. Both seek to define how much information 
must be provided before the balance tips in favor of the applicant. 
The same features of new Rule 56 should also cause it to fail 
the more modern, functional analysis of procedural rules. That analy-
sis is based on the observation that the AP A's mention of procedural 
rules is 
essentially a "housekeeping" measure, "[t]he distinctive purpose of ... [which] 
is to ensure 'that agencies retain latitude in organizing their internal operations.' 
"69 
Thus, 
67 [d. at 863-64. 
68 [d. at 864. 
69 Air Transport v. Dep't. of Transportation, 900 F.2d at 376 (citations omitted) (quoting 
American Hospital Association v. Bowen, 834 F.2d 1037, 1041 (D.C. Cir. 1987» (emphasis in 
original). 
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[w]here nominally "procedural" rules "encode[] a substantive value judgment" 
or "substantially alter the rights or interests of regulated" parties," 
the rules will be con'sidered substantive.70 
These comments apply directly to new Rule 56. It is beyond 
peradventure that new Rule 56 is intended to encode substantive value 
judgments regarding a patent applicant's duty to disclose information 
and, as a result, the fact required to hold a patent unenforceable. The 
Rule does not mean to address housekeeping details in the PTO only. 
Rather, it is intended to substantially alter the rights of both patent 
applicants before the PTO and patent owners before the courts in 
infringement litigation. The rule is therefore not procedural under the 
more modern test. 
c. Rule 56 as an Interpretive Rule 
Agencies have the power to promulgate rules that express the 
agency's opinion of how a legal rule should be applied.71 Interpretive 
rules such as these may address matters that are beyond the agency's 
statutory delegation.72 Thus, if new Rule 56 could be characterized 
as an interpretive rule, the problems discussed above in connection 
with Congress' delegation in Section 6 could be minimized. The 
recent trend in administrative law, in fact, is toward giving greater 
deference to an agency's interpretive decisions.73 
In re Van Omum 74 provides an example of the CCP A recogniz-
ing the PTO's interpretive powers. Van Omum addressed the validity 
of Rule 1.321, 37 C.F.R., which pertained to terminal disclaimers. 
The appellant challenged the rule on two bases that are relevant to 
this discussion. First, the rule was said to be contrary to law. 75 Sec-
ond, it was argued that the rule did not relate to "the conduct of 
proceedings in the Patent and Trademark Office."76 
The 'appellant in Van Omum thus essentially argued the regu-
lation to be an invalid substantive rule. Both of the above grounds 
70Id. (quoting American Hospital Association, 834 F.2d at 1041. 
71 3 Stein § 15.07[3]. 
72 See generally, 2 Davis § 7.11 at 55 = 57. 
73 See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984). See 
generally Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes in the Regulatory State, 103 Harv. L. Rev. 405 (1989); 
Farina, Statutory Interpretation and the Balance of Power in the Administrative State, 89 Colum. 
L. Rev. 457 (1989). 
74688 F.2d 937 (CCPA 1982). 
75 Id. at 949-50 (Judge Baldwin, dissenting). 
76 Id. at 949 (emphasis in original). 
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went directly to the language of Section 6 limiting Congress' dele-
gation to the Commissioner. As stated above, transgressing those 
limits is a primary basis for invalidating a substantive rule. 
In response, the court determined the rule to be valid. It did not, 
however, find the rule to be substantive within the meaning of the 
AP A. 77 Rather, the court seemed to avoid that issue entirely. 78 In-
stead, it was primarily interested in establishing that the substance of 
the rule was both wise and not contrary to prior decisional law. 79 
The court therefore made the determinations necessary to uphold 
the regulation, not as a substantive rule, but as a valid interpretive 
rule. The court, in fact, went to some length to note that it agreed 
with the substance of the rule,80 a matter important to reviewing 
interpretive, but not substantive rules .. 
It is fundamentally clear, however, that new Rule 56 is not an 
interpretive rule. Interpretive rules are void to the extent that they 
conflict with the basic law that is being interpreted.81 As discussed 
above, conflict with the existing law is the basic purpose of new Rule 
56. 
There is evidence that the PTO either disagrees with or is not 
aware of this limitation on its authority to promulgate interpretive 
rules. The PTO has asserted that its power to promulgate new Rule 
56 is demonstrated by the prior CCP A decision of Norton v. Curtiss. 82 
77 Van Orhum does not analyze the validity of the regulation in terms of the APA. This may 
not, however, be uncommon. Professor Davis has observed that many decisions in the adminis-
trative-law field do not use precisely correct terminology, perhaps due to the failure of agencies 
and litigation counsel to provide clear guidance. E.g., 2 Davis § 7.13 at 61. There is reason to 
believe that this occurred in Van Orhum. See 686 F.2d at 945 ("Appellants say the regulation is 
'invalid on its face' but they do not explain why beyond contending it is 'substantive and not 
procedural.' "). 
78 After noting the appellant's argument that the regulation was "substantive and not proce-
dural," the court simply stated "[w]e can give no weight to that contention." It noted that many 
of the PTO's rules deal with conditions upon which patents will be granted. Immediately there-
after, the court presented a detailed history of the caselaw on the legal issue that the regulation 
addressed. 686 F.2d at 945-46. 
79 [d. at 946-47. 
80 See e.g., the following language: 
Upon ... extensive review of the situation, we consider it desirable to tie both the termination and the ownership 
of the two patents together, as is required by § 1.321(b), and seeing no substantial obstacle to doing so, hold 
it to be a valid regulation. 
[d. at 948 (emphasis added). 
81 E.g. 2 Davis § 7.8 at 42-43 ("When a rule purports to change the law, it cannot be merely 
interpretive.") See supra p. 12. 
It appears settled that the PTO may promulgate interpretive rules that address common-law, 
rather than statutory, authority. See e.g., Animal Legal Defense Fund, 932 F.2d at 928. 
82 PTO Notice of Final Rulemaking, 57 Fed. Reg. 2024 (replying to public comment). The 
citation to Norton is 433 F.2d 779 (CCPA 1970). 
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The court in Norton did uphold the PTO's authority to promulgate 
an earlier version of Rule 56.83 However, the court also found that 
version of Rule 56 to be coextensive with the common law of ineq-
uitable conduct. 84 The opinion quotes the following passage from In 
re Heany,85 which it describes as containing "unquestionable logic": 
[I]f the Commissioner should find ... that an application or applications are so 
permeated with fraud as to justify the opinion that any patent or patents granted 
on those applications . . . would be annulled or set aside by a court of equity on 
petition of the United States through the Attorney-General, [86] on the ground that 
the patent was obtained through fraud, then it would be the duty of the Commis-
sioner, under law, to refuse, upon that ground, to grant such a patent. 87 
"We take this to indicate," the court continued in Norton, 
that any conduct which will prevent the enforcement of a patent after it issues 
should, if discovered earlier, prevent the issuance of the patent. The only rational, 
practical interpretation of the term "fraud" in Rule 56 which could follow is that 
the term refers to the very same types of conduct which the courts, in patent 
infringement suits, would hold fraudulent. 88 
Norton therefore does not speak to whether the PTO has the 
power to promulgate new Rule 56. The court in Norton addressed 
whether the PTa could act in conformity with the common law. New 
83433 F.2d at 791-92. The version of Rule 56 at issue in Norton read as follows: 
56. Improper applications. 
Any application sworn to in blank, or without inspection by the applicant, and any application altered or partly 
filled in after being signed or sworn to, and also any application fraudulently filed or in connection with which 
any fraud is practiced or attempted on the Patent Office, may be stricken from the files. 
37 C.F.R. § 1.56 (1970). 
84 433 F.2d at 792. 
85 1911 C.D. 139, 171 O.G. 983 (1911). 
86 This reference to the Attorney General is apparently because private litigants could not raise 
the defense of fraudulent procurement in 1911. See Norton, 433 F.2d at 792 n.12. 
87ld at 792 (emphasis added). 
881d. 
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Rule 56, in contrast, seeks to force the courts to act 10 a particular 
manner by overturning the common law. 89 
The distinction should be critical to whether new Rule 56 is a 
valid interpretive rule.90 Simply put, new Rule 56 is not intended to 
interpret any existing authority. Rather, it is intended to layout a 
new standard that is substantially different from the current law. It 
therefore cannot be an interpretive rule. 
D. Rule 56 as a policy statement 
It appears clear that new Rule 56 is also not a policy statement. 
The rule is plainly designed to impose a specific set of criteria for 
determining whether information in material. It provides for no dis-
cretion on the part of the decisionmaker.91 There is no indication that 
the PTO will reconsider the wisdom of the rule's substance in any 
future proceeding where its application may be called for. 92 
Pickus v. United States Board of Parole93 provides an illustration 
of how these concerns relate to a particular agency action. Pickus 
89 Digital Equipment Corp., 653 F.2d 701, appears to be to the same effect. There, the court 
fundamentally relied upon the fact that the version of Rule 56 at issue did nothing more than set 
forth the existing common-law rule of unenforceability due to inequitable conduct: 
It is scarcely unreasonable that the Commissioner. in the exercise of his rule-making authority. should make 
provision for recognition of this equitable principle in the Patent and Trademark Office. Otherwise the PTO 
would be obliged to issue claims knowing that they were unenforceable as a matter of law. The question. then, 
is .•. whether ..• [the prohibition of fraud embodied in rule 56] is "inconsistent with law." We cannot 
conclude that this is the case where the courts have determined "fraud" to be a basis of unenforceability of a 
patent. 
[d. at 710-11. See also the discussion at 653 F.2d at 712: 
[E]ven if the PTO had reissued the claims in such circumstances [where fraud had occurred]. it is likely that a 
court would have found them nonetheless unenforceable •..• This being the case, there seems to be no good 
reason to prohibit the PTO from conducting its own examination of alleged fraudulent conduct. as part of its 
reissue proceedings ..••... We conclude, therefore. that the PTO does not exceed its statutory authority 
when it refuses to reissue a patent on the ground that it was procured though fraud. 
90 These observations are also relevant to whether cases such as Norton and Digital Equipment 
Corp. construe the PTO's ability to promulgate rules "not inconsistent with law" according to 
the PTO's Congressional delegation. See supra pp. 17-18. 
91 "If it appears that a so-called policy statement is in purpose or effect one that narrowly 
limits administrative discretion, it will be taken for what it is - a binding rule of substantive 
law." Guardian Federal Savings and Loan Assoc. v. FSLlC, 589 F.2d 658, 666 (D.C. Cir. 
1978). See also Brown Express, 607 F.2d at 701 ("Nor does it [the agency notice] set a goal 
that future proceedings may achieve, for the change has been presented as a fait accompli." 
(emphasis in original)). 
92 See Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. FPC, 506 F.2d 33, 39 (D.C. Cir. 1974) ("When the 
agency states that in subsequent proceedings it will thoroughly consider not only the policy's 
applicability to the facts of a given case but also the underlying validity of the policy itself, then 
the agency intends to treat the order as a general statement of policy. "), and Brock v. Cathedral 
Bluffs Shale Oil Co., 796 F.2d 533, 537-38 (D.C. Cir. 1986). 
93507 F.2d 1107 (D.C. Cir. 1974). 
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involved a review of certain regulations setting out the factors that 
the Board would consider in determining whether to parole prisoners. 
The rules set out 
a complex, detailed table which purport[ ed] to state the range of months which the 
board will require an inmate to serve depending upon the severity of his offense . 
. . and his 'salient factor score,' a number computed according to factors also 
announced in the [rules].94 
According to the opinion, 
[a] major Board contention is that, functionally viewed, its actions ... are either 
general statements of policy, interpretive rules, or rules relating to agency organ-
ization .... 95 
The court disagreed, and held the rule to be substantive. In doing 
so, the court specifically noted the effect of the disputed provisions 
on the Board's future actions: 
The guidelines which the board adopted prior to this action . . . were of a kind 
calculated to have a substantial effect on ultimate parole decisions. They consist 
of nine general categories of factors, broken down into a total of 32 sub-categories, 
often fairly specific. Although they provide no formula for parole determination, 
they cannot help but focus the decisionmaker's attention on the Board-approved 
criteria .... 
The November regulation is more formula like, and hence has an even greater 
impact on an inmates' chances for parole .... Thus, the rules which define parole 
selection criteria . . . are substantive agency action, for they define a fairly tight 
framework to circumscribe the board's statutorily broad criteria.96 
When judged according to these criteria, new Rule 56 is even 
less a policy statement than the agency action was in Pickus. New 
Rule 56 provides an all-inclusive formula for determining whether 
the patent applicant has disclosed information to the PTO sufficiently. 
Rather than simply tending to focus a decisionmaker's attention on 
certain criteria, it requires that the decision be made according to its 
criteria exclusively. In fact, the court in Pickus observed that the 
rules there were "designed to, and almost surely will lead to, more 
nearly uniform decisions, and more restricted decisionmaking. "97 
That same statement describes the purpose and intent behind new 
Rule 56 exactly. 
94Id. at 1110-11. 
95 Id. at 1112. 
96 Id. at 1112-13. 
97Id. at 1111. 
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Another obstacle may bar new Rule 56 from being a policy 
statement. Policy statements are promulgated to guide an agency's 
own application of unclear or ambiguous legal standards.98 The PTO, 
however, does not apply Rule 56 to determine issues of inequitable 
conduct in the district courts. Until recently, it has refused to even 
comment on the issue when it appears in its own internal proceed-
ings.99 It continues to avoid Rule 56 issues in the context of ex parte 
prosecution,100 which is by far the largest category of patent pro-
ceedings in the PTO. 
Thus, the purpose of new Rule 56 is fundamentally different 
from that of a policy statement. 101 It is not intended primarily to 
inform the public of how the PTO intends to decide future cases. 
Rather, it is plainly intended to create a legal standard via rulemaking 
procedures for the courts to follow. 
V. NEW RULE 56 AS A HORTATORY STATEMENT 
It therefore appears that new Rule 56, when viewed as an attempt 
to correct the law of inequitable conduct, is outside the AP A. It is 
neither a substantive, interpretive, nor procedural rule, nor is it a 
statement of policy. 102 What then is new Rule 56, and how should 
the courts treat it when the issue is raised by litigants and amici? 
98 E.g., Pacific Gas & Electric, 506 F.2d at 38·39 ("A policy statement announces the 
agency's tentative intentions for the future." (emphasis added»; 3 Davis 15.07[4] ("General 
statements of policy announce an agency's policy plan for enforcement of a particular statute." 
(emphasis added)). 
99 See PTO Policy Statement on Inequitable Conduct Detenninations, (Comm'r. Pat. Sept. 8. 
1988), reprinted at 36 PTCJ 616 (Oct. 6, 1988) and the clarification thereof at 1096 O.G. 19. 
The professed reason for this decision is that the PTO is not suited to deciding the questions of 
intent that are involved in inequitable conduct issues. Id. 
The sole exception to this practice appears to have been the PTO's continued practice of 
instituting disciplinary proceedings from time to time under 37 C.F.R., Part 10. These proceedings 
are typically initiated after a separate determination of inequitable conduct has been made in 
another proceeding, such as a district-court litigation. 
The PTO has recently reversed itself as to interference proceedings. E.g., Consideration of 
Fraud and Inequitable Conduct in Patent Interference Cases, (Comm'r Pat. Oct. 24, 1991), 
reprinted at 42 PTCJ 611 (Oct. 31, 1991). It wiII now consider inequitable conduct issues when 
raised by motion in those proceedings. 
100 See the Second PTO Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 56 Fed. Reg. 37323. 
101 See e.g., Industrial Safety Equipment Association v. E.P.A., 837 F.2d 1115 n.8 (D.C. 
Cir. 1988) ("[T]here is no evidence at all that the Guide [the agency's rulemaking action] will 
alter the EPA or NIOSH's regulatory behavior ... , so the Guide would not even qualify as an 
agency statement of policy. "). 
102 This result, although apparently unusual, is not unprecedented. E.g., Industrial Safety 
Equipment Association v. E.P.A., 837 F.2d 1115 (finding agency action to be outside the APA, 
and hence unreviewable). 
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A. Analogy to Skidmore v. Swift 
In essence, the situation surrounding new Rule 56 is this: Be-
cause the PTO is not a party to patent infringement actions its op-
portunities to help shape the law of inequitable conduct are limited. 
At the same time, however, it apparently sees a need to participate 
in that process.· New Rule 56 is the means the PTO has chosen to 
achieve that participation. Essentially, the PTO is using its new rule 
to exhort the Federal Circuit to adopt a particular legal definition of 
inequitable conduct. 
It appears that agencies act as advocates in this manner infre-
quently. Nevertheless, the practice is not without precedent,IOO and 
some useful analogies can be made. Skidmore v. Swijt/04 for ex-
ample, involved a federal agency's use of such a hortatory statementI°5 
in connection with the Fair Labor Standards Act. 106 Skidmore in-
volved an action between an employer and employee. The employee 
had been hired to act as a firefighter at the employer's plant. The 
dispute centered on whether the time the employee was required to 
be on-call at the plant counted as time worked for purposes of cal-
culating the employee's wages. 
Under the Fair Labor Standards Act a federally appointed Ad-
ministrator was to seek out and punish violations of the Act's pro-
visions. His authority, however, was not exclusive, in that private 
persons could also file actions to enforce the Act. 107 While the Ad-
ministrator was not a party in Skidmore, his office had published an 
interpretive bulletin on the precise question at issue in Skidmore. In 
it, he substantially agreed with the position of the employee. His 
office participated in the Skidmore litigation as an amicus. 
The Court in Skidmore discussed why the Administrator's po-
sition was relevant even though the Administrator was not a party. 
103 E.g., Federal Labor Relations Authority v. Department of the Treasury, 884 F.2d 1446 
(D.C. Cir. 1989). 
104 323 U.S. 134 (1944). Skidmore was for a time a lead case on the extent to which courts 
should defer to the interpretive rule making of agencies. 
105 The term "hortatory statement" is the author's own. Agencies have apparently advocated 
court adoption of similar non-APA rulemaking actions too rarely for a name to become generally 
accepted. 
10629 U.S.C. §§ 201-19. 
107 In this way, the Administrator's authority was coextensive with that of private plaintiffs 
much the same way that the Justice Department's authority to police antitrust violations is coex-
tensive with that of complainants in civil actions. 
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In "[p ]ursuit of his duties," the Court observed, the Administrator 
"has accumulated a considerable experience .... "108 
The Administrator's policies are made in pursuance of official duty, based upon 
more specialized experience and broader investigations and information than is 
likely to come to a judge in a particular case .... Good administration of the Act 
and good judicial administration alike require that the standards of public enforce-
ment and those for determining private rights shall be at variance only where 
justified by very good reasons. 109 
When new Rule 56 is offered as authority in a patent infringe-
ment suit, the situation will possess obvious factual parallels with 
Skidmore. The regulations at issue in each case purport to govern the 
legal issue before the court. Neither case, however, involves the 
agency's own application of the regulation. Thus, both cases concern 
whether an agency regulation should control matters beyond the con-
text of agency action. 
There are significant differences in the situations, however, some 
of which go directly to whether new Rule 56 is relevant. The Ad-
ministrator in Skidmore, for instance, had a major responsibility for 
enfo'rcing the law at issue. In contrast, the PTO has chosen largely 
not to involve itself in making duty-to-disclose determinations.lloThe 
PTO, moreover, does not enforce the law of inequitable conduct via 
court action.111 As a result, the Commissioner's attempt to define 
inequitable conduct in new Rule 56 is therefore probably not "in 
pursuance of" any "official duty."1l2 As a further result, the Su-
preme Court's fear of a "variance" in the law does not apply. 
B. The persuasiveness of Rule 56 as a hortatory statement 
The Court in Skidmore recommended careful scrutiny of the 
particular hortatory statement under review: 
The weight of [the Administrator's] judgment in a particular case will depend upon 
the thoroughness evident in its consideration, the validity of its. reasoning, its 
consistency with earlier and later pronouncements, and all those factors which give 
it power to persuade, if lacking power to controL 
108 323 U.S. at 137·38. 
109 [d. at 139-40. 
110 See supra pp. 32-33. 
111 [d. The sole exception appears to be the PTO's defense, on appeal to the courts, of 
interference determinations in which allegations of inequitable conduct have been raised by mo-
tion. 
112 323 U.S. at 139. 
113 [d. at 140. 
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Applying this scrutiny to new Rule 56 yields mixed results. On 
the positive side, new Rule 56 is the result of extended notice-and-
comment procedures.114 The major industry and professional groups 
have participated. 115 The effort has spanned a considerable length of 
time. It presumably has involved considerable deliberation. 
On the negative side, however, new Rule 56 is clearly not con-
sistent with prior PTO pronouncements. Now-withdrawn proposed 
Rule 57 set forth a considerably different standard. 116 The fact that 
successive Commissioners have taken such different positions is at 
least troubling, and possibly calls into question the validity of the 
reasoning behind the new standard.1l7 
A more important inconsistency arises out of the basic purpose 
of new Rule 56. The new rule is inconsistent with the current, com-
mon-law, judge-fashioned standard. Users of the patent system have 
failed to persuade the Federal Circuit directly, through advocacy as 
parties in individual cases, to adopt a more lenient standard. Stripped 
to its essentials, new Rule 56 is simply an effort to persuade on the 
same issue indirectly. The Federal Circuit's choice of a more stringent 
standard is presumably the product of careful, prolonged considera-
tion at least rivalling that behind new Rule 56. The rulemaking origins 
of new Rule 56 therefore may not be a reason to choose it over the 
Federal Circuit's present standard. 
VI. COMMON-LAW JURISPRUDENTIAL LIMITATIONS 
It is also clear that the standard principles of common-law de-
velopment should limit the effect of new Rule 56. New Rule 56, as 
a hortatory statement, does not establish the law. Rather, it is merely 
114 See supra pp. 9-11. 
115 The IPO, the AIPLA, and the Patent, Trademark, and Copyright Section of the ABA have 
all provided comments to the PTO. See the summary of the October 8, 1991 hearing, 42 PTCJ 
573. 
116 See supra pp. 9-10. 
117 The difference between the views of Commissioners Manbeck and Quigg appears to have 
been due at least in part to a fundamental lack of consensus among the PTO's various consti-
tuencies. See e.g., PTO Notice of Final Rulemaking, 57 Fed. Reg. 2023-33; summary of state-
ments given at the PTO's October 8, 1991 hearing, 42 PTCJ 573. Roughly speaking, patent 
holders and their counsel appear to favor relaxation of the duty to disclose to the "but for" 
standard of now-withdrawn Rule 57. See the summary of statements by the IPO, ABA, and 
AIPLA, 42 PTCJ 575-74. Compare the statement of the NYPTCLA, ill. at 575. Persons more 
concerned with the public interest appear less likely to favor change from the current standard. 
E.g., the statement of Professor M. Davis, Cleveland State University College of Law, id. at 
575. The general alignment of constituents in this manner raises the disturbing issue whether the 
PTO's rulemaking efforts are the result of a balanced presentation of the relevant public and 
private interests. 
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advice to the courts, who remain ultimately responsible for deter-
mining the correct standard. New Rule 56 therefore provides no rea-
son for the courts to alter their traditional techniques of common-law 
decisionmaking, such as stare decisis and the distinction between 
holding and dicta. 
This fact may be at significant odds with the plans of the relevant 
interest groups. According to the AIPLA, the PTO intends to appear 
as an amicus to ask the courts to adopt new Rule 56 as the law of 
inequitable conduct. 118 The implication is that efforts will be made 
in one, or a small number of early cases. 
New Rule 56, however, is very complexY9 It is virtually im-
possible for all of its substantive provisions to be present in a single 
case, or even in a reasonably small number of cases. Under accepted 
principles of common-law, therefore, the Federal Circuit will likely 
not address more than a small fraction of the rule at any given time. 
In fact, because dicta is not binding in subsequent cases the Federal 
Circuit may even lack the power to provide more expansive review. 
Two prior decisions of the Federal Circuit show how these lim-
itations have already operated specifically in the context of PTO 
regulatory action. In the first of these, Patlex Corp. v. Mossinghoff20 
the Federal Circuit upheld M.P .E.P. § 2286 in the face of a challenge 
that the provision was in conflict with the statutory sections of Title 
35, U.S.c., relating to reexamination proceedings.l2l Some years 
later, the Federal Circuit struck down Section 2286 as inconsistent 
with that same group of sections in Ethicon v. QUigg. 122 
Ethicon is not inconsistent with Patlex. Rather, the result in 
Ethicon derives from the fact that each case reviewed different aspects 
of Section 2286. Section 2286 sets out the conditions under which 
the PTO would stay reexamination proceedings in light of ongoing 
district court litigation: 
If reexamination is ordered the reexamination will continue until the Office be-
comes aware that a trial on the merits has begun at which time the reexamination 
will normally be stayed . . . . 
118 See supra note 7. 
119 See supra notes 4-5. New Rule 56 runs for over an entire column in the Federal Register. 
The text of all the regulatory changes, including changes proposed to the rules governing infor-
mation disclosure statements and reexamination, runs for over two pages. PTO Notice of Final 
Rulemaking, 57 Fed. Reg. 2034-36. 
120 758 F.2d 594 (Fed. Cir. 1985). 
121 35 U.S.C. §§ 301-07. 
122849 F.2d 1422 (Fed. Cir. 1988). 
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Patlex addressed whether the PTO could refuse to stay a reexami-
nation proceeding. 123 There, an infringement litigation concerning the 
same patent was pending in a district court. The district court had 
announced in advance that it would stay the district court proceeding 
if the reexamination went forward. The PTO refused to consider that 
factor in deciding whether to issue a stay, relying instead on the 
lariguage in Section 2286. 124 Ethicon, in contrast, addressed whether 
the PTO could stay a reexamination proceeding where trial of the 
patent in district court had concluded and a decision on the validity 
was expected.125 The seemingly opposite results in Ethicon and Pa-
tlex, therefore, are simply the result of judicial review being unable 
to address all aspects of a regulation in a single decision. 126 
There is every reason to believe that these same limitations will 
apply to the Federal Circuit's review of new Rule 56. As a result, 
the PTO and interest groups will not change the standard of inequi-
table conduct quickly even if they are victorious as amici. Instead, 
only a series of decisions can entrench the standard of new Rule 56 
as the law. A substantial period of time may elapse before this process 
is complete. the effort required to maintain a presence as amici over 
this period may be impractical. In any event, practitioners in the 
meantime will be left to guess whether the present standard or that 
of new Rule 56 is controlling. 127 
VII. CONCLUSION 
It appears that new Rule 56 may not solve the problems the 
patent bar perceives in the area of inequitable conduct. The provisions 
of the new rule may never replace the current law. Even if they do, 
they will not do so quickly. The existence of the new rule, moreover, 
with its ambiguous effect, will likely make the law of inequitable 
conduct more uncertain over the short term, not less so as was orig-
inally hoped. 
123 [d. at 606-07. 
124 [d. at 597-98. 
125 849 F.2d 1424-25. 
126 See also Animal Legal Defense Fund v. Quigg 932 F .2d 920, supra pp. 15-16. There, the 
Federal Circuit expressly avoided addressing whether a portion of the regulation in question was 
valid. 932 F.2d at 928 n.9 ("[T)he question whether section 553 requirements extend to that part 
of the Rule which precludes the patentability of humans is not in issue and we do not address 
it. "). 
127 See, e.g., Saxon, 42 PTCJ 575. 
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In addition, new Rule 56 may not alter the debate over inequi-
table conduct significantly. Whether the courts adopt new Rule 56 
will turn largely on whether the standard in that rule is consistent 
with the aims of the patent system. These same policy arguments 
have always been available to patent litigants faced with inequitable-
conduct issues; presumably they have been using them already. 
Finally, there is reason to question whether rulemaking was the 
PTO's most effective means of obtaining the sought-after changes. 
An agency's position taken as an amicus can carry the same weight 
as an official rulemaking action. l28 The PTO, therefore, could have 
chosen to approach the Federal Circuit as an amicus without a prior 
rulemaking proceeding. That choice might have allowed the PTO to 
act more quickly than the almost three years it has taken to reach this 
stage in the rulemaking process. If so, the PTO might have substan-
tially changed the law of inequitable conduct already. 
128 E.g., FLRA v. Treasury, 884 F.2d 1446. 
